? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? In Making Democracy Work, Robert D. Putnam explored the origins of effective democratic government, specifically asking “what are the conditions for creating strong, responsive, effective representative institutions?” (Putnam, 6) ?
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? To answer this he focused on Italy for two decades, beginning in 1970 when Italy created new governing institutions for all of its new 15 regions. These regional governments were each given the same wide range of powers, and Putnam understandably saw this as a rare opportunity to study the birth and growth of institutions. The situation was complicated in that the Southern regions of Italy were still socially and economically underdeveloped, while the Northern regions were already becoming post-industrial (Putnam, 7). However, this variation was welcomed as a chance to see whether institutions would develop differently in regions that were quite dissimilar.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? The answer Putnam found was that history and social context are vital in determining institutional effectiveness. Specifically, institutional effectiveness depended on “social capital” – the things that make societies cooperate by bringing people together – and the history of social capital, as well as historic and current levels of social equality. The implications (besides the methodological ones, which we will discuss later) of these conclusions are weighty. Whereas many studies and theories have alluded to the possibility that a strong society and group identity means there is a weak state, here we see the opposite is true. Democracy then relies on a strong civil society.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? How did Putnam arrive at this conclusion, and what were the positives and negatives of this approach?
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? Straight from Appendix A we can see a summary of Putnam’s methods, which included: surveys of regional councilors, surveys of community leaders, nationwide mail surveys of community leaders, mass surveys, institutional / political case studies, analyses of legislation, case studies of regional planning, citizen contact experiments, and a special study of Friuli-Venezia Giulia (Putnam, 187-192). These qualitative and quantitative research techniques were either applied to all 20 regions in Italy, 6 selected regions (selected on the basis of representing the vast differences in Italy), or a single region.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? But Putnam’s conclusions could not possibly have been drawn without supplementing these analyses with a good amount of historical and theoretical background. He goes as far back as the 11th Century to trace and compare the development of civic community in the Northern and Southern regions, and draws on theory from Aristotle, Burke, Rousseau, and Toqueville among many others.
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? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? He guides us through his findings beginning with the early period of institutional reform, demonstrating how it affected governance at “the grassroots” (Putnam, 15). Specifically, Putnam explored the changing identities and roles of regional councilors, and perhaps most importantly, demonstrated that they were becoming less partisan and more ideologically flexible. The new institutions were forcing governors to broker, collaborate, and deal with their constituents in a new way. Despite this, the disparity between North and South seemed to be worsening, and Northerners were becoming increasingly frustrated with what they perceived as “handouts to corrupt Southerners” (Putnam, 61).
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? Next, Putnam took on the task of judging government performance by evaluating policy processes, policy pronouncements and policy implementation. To these three areas he attributed 12 indicators of institutional performance, including cabinet stability, legislative innovation, and local health unit expenditures, among others. The indicators, he claimed, were designed to measure “outputs” as opposed to “outcomes”, since outcomes may be the result of events outside the government’s control. The results showed significant regional differences in performance, and also demonstrated that these differences were consistent over time. Although each region was given the same institutional structures, funding, and resources, some regions governed better than others (Putnam, 82).
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? Putnam goes on to explain that the Northern regions had better institutional performance because they were socio-economically more advanced and demonstrated a higher level of civic community. The relationship between socio-economic modernity and institutional performance is explored, and the effects of civic community are studied in more detail. Four indicators are used to gauge civic-ness: Preferential voting, referendum turnout, newspaper readership, and the scarcity of sports and cultural associations (Putnam, 91). The results demonstrated that levels of civic-ness and institutional performance were correlated; for example, areas with high levels of civic-ness also had better institutional performance. Moreover, people in the North were happier living in a more civic community, while those in the traditional and hierarchical South felt exploited.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? To see why some regions were more civic than others, Putnam leads us through a thousand years of Italian and European history. He shows us that the fragmentation of North-South can be traced back to approximately 1100 AD (Putnam, 121), when Norman mercenaries controlled the South, and the North was beginning to thrive under communal republicanism. Essentially, despite the upheavals and changes over time, the civic community in the North persisted in various degrees and ways over time. Even when Putnam quantitatively “disciplines” his tale, as he puts it, through a quantitative measure of civic engagement in the late 1800’s and early 1900’s, he finds that the success or failure of regional governments could have been predicted a century earlier (Putnam, 150). In other words, levels of civic community remained essentially unchanged from the late 1800’s to the time the regional institutionalization experiment began. The proposition that civic engagement is not linked to prosperity is also contentious. Nevertheless, the point becomes clear: “Civic traditions have remarkable staying power” (Putnam, 157).
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? In the final chapter, Putnam takes a theoretical approach in trying to explain why civic community has such a profound effect on the possibility of effective democratic institutions, and why civic traditions persist so much over time. He relied mostly on the theory of social capital, which he described as the “features of social organization, such as trust, norms, and networks, that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions” (Putnam, 167). Most important for our discussion later however, is that capital or the absence thereof is self-reinforcing and cumulative; furthermore, institutional patterns are self-reinforcing as well.
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? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? It is easy to identify what Putnam did quite well. The mixture and sheer amount of qualitative and quantitative analysis and the blending of social theory and historical narrative give Making Democracy Work the feeling that it would have indeed taken 20 years to generate something so complete.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? Among the finer points is Putnam’s appreciation for experience in analysis. Taking after journalism and anthropology, Putnam believes a researcher should “marinate himself in the minutiae of an institution – to experience its customs and practices, its successes and failings as those who live it every day do” (Putnam, 12). Amongst the scattergrams and bar graphs, it is easy to forget that Putnam and his colleagues were sometimes immersed in the institutions they were studying, and that the qualitative insight gained is beyond conjecture.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? As well, although Putnam identifies independent variables and dependent variables at the beginning of the book, he does not fall into simple cause-effect formulations in his conclusions. The evidence “suggests” or “correlates” but never proves. Part of what makes the study so rich is that we are continuously left with questions, and not the nagging superfluous type. Instead, Putnam takes a path-dependent dialectical approach in his theoretical and historical analysis, and makes room for multiple causal mechanisms and contingency. He plainly states that “any single factor interpretation is wrong” (Putnam, 158) and goes on to ask “through what mechanism might the norms and networks of the civic community contribute to economic prosperity?” (Putnam, 159). Moreover, his discussion of the founding of communal republicanism certainly considers the work of chance: the communes “sprang originally from voluntary associations, formed when groups of neighbors swore personal oaths to render one another mutual assistance” (Putnam, 124).? That the Norman mercenaries invaded the South just as Southern towns were beginning to desire self-government, is surely a matter of luck, in this case bad luck, as well (Putnam, 123). But what of Putnam’s quantitative work?
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? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? Putnam’s attempt to “discipline” the narrative and theory by “careful counting” (Putnam, 148) is impressive, and probably the most prominent feature of the book. There are 56 tables, scattergrams, bar graphs, charts, and maps in a book that is 185 pages long. The reader would probably be challenged to find aspects of Putnam’s problem that went unmeasured. But some of these illustrations are also complex, and cannot be interpreted without careful reading. The scattergrams are particularly problematic – appearing as though somebody had pitched their alpha-bits cereal onto a whiteboard. There are no numbers on them, confusing the reader as to how the regions and institutions are actually being measured, and adding to the mess is an absence of regression lines. Moreover, in the tables there is often a column titled “factor loading”, which, according to a mere endnote, is the mathematical technique by which “all indices in this book are based” (Putnam, 216). But the description of this technique is convoluted to say the least, and probably requires more know-how than what is usually possessed by anybody willing to read a green and orange book about democracy.
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? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? Some writers, such as Edward Muir, have taken issue with ? ? ? ? ? ? Putnam’s interpretation of Italian history. In The Sources of Civil Society in Italy, Muir argues that Putnam’s account of a civically engaged and collaborative Northern communal republic is mistaken. Muir instead speaks of the tyrants, civil war, and distrust that characterized life in Northern Italy (Muir, 406). There are two fairly obvious problems with Muir’s assertions. First, unlike Putnam, he has nothing to say about Southern Italy, and second, Putnam protects himself from this type of charge by simply stating “We must not exaggerate the egalitarianism of the communes nor their success in resolving social conflict and controlling violence” (Putnam, 129).
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? Sheri Berman, in Civil Society and the Collapse of the Weimar Republic, on the other hand, demonstrates that a thriving civil society can undermine democracy. She explains that the Nazis came to power exactly because German life was so associational, and therefore, any rule which states civil societies are more democratic is incorrect (Berman, 402). But for Putnam there was no such rule. The problem here is that Berman is trying to explain an entirely different thing - the fall of the Weimar Republic, whereas Putnam is trying to explain variations in institutional performance. If he had been concerned with the decline of democracy he would certainly have spent more time studying Fascism in Italy. Neither Muir’s nor Berman’s criticisms are particularly problematic.
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? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? Furthermore, it is obvious that in some cases Putnam only highlighted the cases that suited his argument and that there may have been a problem with his questionnaires to governors. And admittedly, he was sometimes mistaken in his interpretation of information. For example, in the case where Putnam believed the success or failure of regional governments could have been predicted “with extraordinary accuracy” (Putnam, 150) a century earlier – if one closely examines the scattergram this is not quite the case. Here he did not compare within the regions of the North and South as he did elsewhere. But compared to all that is brilliant about this book, and the real problem – that is, the development and arrangement of quantitative information – these problems are nothing, and to focus on them would be to nitpick a tad much.
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