Myths about Communism (or “I haven’t read any Marx; I’m too lazy and content living in ignorance like a tool”) – An ongoing collection…
1) “We’ll all become lazy / people won’t pull their weight”.
People who say this haven’t even read the Manifesto, which is what really pisses us off. It’s like if I started talking shit about the bible, like “Jesus killed babies”, without even reading the bible.
There will always be laziness. Even in a communist society there will be laziness. But as Marx points out, and it holds true today for the most part, in bourgeois society, people who work acquire nothing, and those who acquire anything do not work. Today, if you’re rich you can simply live off the interest. Do we need to give examples? Here are some that are well known:
Hockey players, baseball players, Hollywood stars, corporate executives… Sure, they “work”. But do they work so hard as to make MILLIONS more than the proletarian, who works for a wage and only manages to subsist?
As for “pulling one’s weight”… If pulling your weight was a measure of success, here are the world’s richest people:
1. William Gates III, Washington, $46.6B, Microsoft
2. Warren Buffett, Nebraska, $42.9B, Berkshire Hathaway
3. Karl Albrecht, Germany, $23B, supermarkets
4. Prince Alwaleed Bin Talal Alsaud, Saudi Arabia, $21.5B, investments
5. Paul Allen, Washington, $21B, Microsoft, investments
6. Alice Walton, Texas, $20B, Wal-Mart
6. Helen Walton, Arkansas, $20B, Wal-Mart
6. Jim Walton, Arkansas, $20B, Wal-Mart
6. John Walton, Arkansas, $20B, Wal-Mart
6. S. Robson Walton, Arkansas, $20B, Wal-Mart
Bill Gates would be pulling 1 267 544 times the weight of the “average” American, whose annual salary, according to the Bureau of Labour Statistics is $36 764.
The Wal-Mart siblings must be hard at work union busting again, because each of them make 544 010 times what the average American makes. I’m working up a sweat just thinking about all the labour they must have put in to make so much.
There will also be less laziness in a communist society because: 1) The same (sometimes dirty) work will often not be done by the same person all the time; 2) People will know they are working for the good of society as a whole and, in any case, not for the profit of one or a few individuals.
2) “It always ends up a dictatorship”.
When people say this they mean “Communism ends up being a dictatorship”, when in fact communism has not yet existed. Then again, the transition to communism is supposed to be a dictatorship of the proletariat. And the “communist states” which we have known thus far in history actually referred to themselves as “socialist states”, understanding that communism could not be achieved unless the dangers posed to the movement from without and within were removed. Look at the examples:
The Soviet Union – There was never any doubt that it was under constant threat from counterrevolutionaries within its borders and across the globe. Cuba – Is 90 miles off the coast of Florida… Need we say more?
This does not justify some of the horrible acts these regimes have committed (ie: the purges, executions, and re-locations of the Stalin era), but it should provide a context as to why the “Communist ideal” was not achieved. While the proletariat is under threat it requires direction. It needs to subjugate bourgeois forces that attempt to thwart revolution.
It is also worth noting that most of the communist states, save those that began as capitalist states and were invaded, were already dictatorships before “communism” took hold. This presented some challenges, many of which were noted by Lenin in the years before he died (ie: bureaucracy, cult of the personality, anti-democratic forces).
3) “Communism goes against human nature”.
This is something else that really irks us, since it’s also addressed in the manifesto. There is no such thing as a static human nature. As the mode of production and property relations change, so do our social norms. The will of the ruling class, the bourgeoisie, is transformed by them into the will of the people everywhere and for all time.
Engels showed that in earlier societies the focus was on co-operation rather than competition, and further anthropological and historical research has shown us that certain societies have at times been extremely selfless (ie: certain Native American tribes) and that some cultures show no evidence of a significant level of social stratification (some Mesopotamian civilizations, etc).
But you can see that co-operation works in every day life! To say that competition is “natural” sounds ludicrous, and for communists to say they will eliminate competition is equally laughable. All that communists propose is to remove competition from those areas where it is most destructive, that is, those areas where it affects the distribution of resources that we need to live.
4) “Communists want to abolish private property”.
Actually, this is true. J Sorry. All property will be held in common. As Marx noted in the Manifesto, this is nothing to fear, since capitalism has removed property from the hands of 9/10ths of the population already.
5) “Individuality will disappear”.
To quote Marx – “You must, therefore, confess that by “individual” you mean no other person than the bourgeois, than the middle class owner of property. This person must, indeed, be swept out of the way, and be made impossible”.
But if by “individuality” you mean “the freedom to have a mohawk and wear a Ramones T-shirt even though I don’t know who the Ramones are…” … Don’t worry. Nobody gives a shit about you.
6) “Communism goes against God”.
Don’t be a dumbass. Nobody will stop you from praying to God, alone, humbly, just like the Bible says you should. But there will be no association whatever between the organization of the people and religion or religious institutions. So in a sense you’re right: Religion will slowly fade out of existence. But trust us, you won’t need it because everything will be so awesome under communism.
In 1923 Georg Lukacs, the famous Marxist philosopher and literary critic, wrote History and Class Consciousness. It stands today as one of the greatest works of Marxist philosophy, and is known to have influenced the thinking of such prominent Marxists as Sartre, Marcuse, and Kosik, among others. What made it especially significant was the way it essentially agreed with Marx’s Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844, which were discovered and published in 1932, and which Lukacs could not have possibly read.
More than a philosophical piece, however, History and Class Consciousness is often seen as a political work intended to address the practical problem of the proletarian revolution against capitalist reification.1 It is often said that Lukacs approach to this problem was to simply amalgamate a host of theories including Marx’s economic fetishism, Weber’s concept of rationalization, Hegel’s concept of appearance, Simmel’s theory of alienation, etc.2 This idea that the concept of reification was born out of putting puzzle pieces together, however, ignores Lukacs’ true intent, and fundamentally ignores his contribution. It almost seems as if every theorist had something to do with creating this concept; that is, every theorist except Lukacs himself. How then, did Lukacs proceed in attempting to solve the practical matter of the proletariat overcoming the world of reification?
Paradoxically, Lukacs saw that solving such concrete issues required a refocusing on Marx’s philosophical concerns such as “totality”, the “species being”, and more importantly, “alienation”. Lukacs’ return to philosophy and the resulting concept of reification, according to which capitalism induces abstractions to become concrete, challenged Marxist orthodoxy and brought Marx’s concept of alienation to the forefront, as central to Marxist thinking, vital to Lukacs’ critique of the bourgeoisie, and of general importance to modern thought. Most importantly, it was of great value to the socialist movement. Even in Marx’s Capital, Lukacs did not simply see a description of the workings of capitalism. He saw, primarily, a putting together of Marx’s early philosophical work. To explore, specifically, how Lukacs strove to solve the practical problems of the revolution by concentrating on Marx’s early work and philosophical concerns we will investigate Marx’s and Lukacs’ understanding of alienation, commodity fetishism, objectification, and finally, reification. As we will see, the concept of reification was inherent in Marx’s work all along, arguably, even before the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844.
First, Lukacs sought a return to Marx’s early work and philosophy - through which he subsequently conceived of his theory of reification - by closely examining the concept of alienation in his own thought and in Marx. As we have already mentioned, Lukacs took Marx’s theory of alienation and made it the central idea of Marx’s theories. However, alienation is not the same as commodity fetishism, which composes the concrete form or economic and productive basis of alienation. According to Lukacs, Marx did not abandon the theory of alienation in favour of a social-scientific approach in analyzing commodity fetishism. Rather, Lukacs contended that Capital, in which the notion of commodity fetishism first appeared, was actually a redefinition of Marx’s philosophical work despite its immediate appearance as a scientific economic treatise.
For both Marx and Lukacs, alienation contains a dialectic structure and overcoming it is paramount to achieving totality. Lukacs contended, as did Marx, that “The object that labour produces, it’s product, confronts it as an alien being, as a power independent of the producer”.3 The products of labor do not belong to the worker, but to the capitalist, and similarly, since wage labour is bought and sold, workers themselves become commodities. What they produce through labour manifests itself in social relations which come to oppress the worker. As Marx noted, “this consolidation of our own product into an objective power over ourselves . . . grows beyond our control, frustrates our expectations, voids our calculations”.4 And the more the worker produces, quantitatively, or qualitatively, the more they are oppressed by the capitalist who uses profits to exert more control. It is the same with religion, says Marx, where “the more man puts into God, the less he retains in himself”.5
As Lukacs explained, this situation gives the worker a “sentimental feeling about nature” because “man’s self-created environment is no more his home but his dungeon”.6 Lukacs agreed with Marx in that, unlike the animal which is immediately one with its vital activity, people make their vital activity and essence, or their work, a mere means to their existence.7 Through labour under capitalism, which snatches away from people what they produce, the worker is alienated from themselves and their vital activity; in essence, their species being.
But for both Lukacs and Marx, while alienation, as a fact of social life and not a subjective state of the individual or mode of consciousness, expresses collective estrangement, oppression, and detachment, it simultaneously triggers an innate drive towards achieving totality or becoming a “thing-for-itself”. Alienation itself demands to be trounced. After all, for Lukacs, the proletariat is the thinking commodity, and therefore destined to emerge from the degradation of capitalist existence and simultaneously redeem all of mankind, which suffers from alienation in many forms.
Clearly, Lukacs saw that overcoming such practical issues as capitalist reification, paradoxically, required a refocusing on Marx’s philosophical concerns, and especially the idea of alienation.
Next, in order to focus on Marx’s philosophical concerns, Lukacs took Marx’s concept of commodity fetishism and interpreted it as a “generalized fetishism”.8 Commodity fetishism was not, as some believe, simply a newer term Marx used to describe alienation, rather it composed the concrete form or economic and productive basis of alienation. The first chapter of the first volume of Capital dealing with commodity fetishism is seen as Lukacs’ “starting point” in an analysis which uncovered reification as a man-made process.9 However, for the purpose intended here, we will focus on showing that Lukacs took this concept and diluted or generalized it as part of his effort to place a greater emphasis on Marxist philosophy.
First, to look at Marx’s concept of commodity fetishism: Commodities, according to Marx, “are functions of the human organism . . . essentially the expenditure of human brain, nerves, muscles”.10 And the fetishism of these commodities, that is, the feature which gives ownership over a product a particular social or supra-sensuous quality, is born in the social character of people’s labour. Because of the capitalistic nature of exchange, which profits the one who does not produce over the one who does, the products of labour acquire a socially objective value which is entirely separated from the object’s actual use value. As Marx noted, “The labour of the private individual manifests itself as an element of the total labour of society only through the relations which the act of exchange establishes between the products, and, through their mediation between the producers.”11 This speaks of the commodity form which conceals the social character of labour by making relations between people appear as relations between material objects. Marx made an analogy with “the misty realm of religion”, where “the products of the human brain appear as autonomous figures endowed with a life of their own which enter into relations both with each other and with the human race. So it is in the world of commodities with the products of men’s hands.”12 This is the fetishism which attaches itself to the products of labour as soon as they are produced as commodities, making it inseparable from the production of commodities. The social character of people’s labour becomes something concrete and imprinted upon the product.
Lukacs, while not in disagreement with Marx on the nature of commodity fetishism, used the concept to express, in general, alienation, objectification, and reification. This placed a greater emphasis on rediscovering Marx’s philosophy and early work as a vital component in the practical political goal of overcoming reification. This treatment of fetishism as reification involves the assumption that Marx’s concept refers not only to the economy, but to the general form of capitalist social life.13 As Lukacs himself asserts while examining commodity fetishism, “Our intention here is to base ourselves on Marx’s economic analyses and to proceed from there to a discussion of the problems growing out of the fetish character of commodities”14. By doing this Lukacs became especially involved in Marx’s depiction of the effects of the commodity structure upon consciousness. From Marx, he came to see that the social relations of production are not expressed as inter-human, but as mediated through commodities, causing our social activity to acquire an independent and determining character, opposite and opposed to its human origin.15 In this way, Lukacs sought to determine how the commodity exchange, together with its structural consequences, is able to influence the true human essence. Naturally, he found that commodity fetishism plays more than an economic and concrete function in obscuring reality, but that in general, it takes on a curious quality in bourgeois society by contributing to alienation, and as such, “is a specific problem of our age”, that is, the capitalist age.16 By taking Marx’s concept of commodity fetishism and interpreting it as a “generalized fetishism”, Lukacs intended to rediscover Marx’s philosophy as a vital component in the practical revolutionary matter of overcoming the capitalist world of reification.
To explore how Lukacs strove to solve these concrete issues by concentrating on Marx’s early work and philosophical concerns we must also turn to his investigation of the idea of objectification in Marx and in his own thought. Objectification according to both Lukacs and Marx is both a symptom and part of the practice of alienation. In Marx’s On the Jewish Question, he contends that so long as people are “so engrossed in religion”, they can only can only objectify their essence by an alien and fantastic being.17 Similarly, under the control of egoistic need , they can only affirm themselves and produce objects in practice by subordinating the product and their own activity to the domination of the alien entity, namely money”.18 This is the general essence of objectification, whereas in the objectification of labour specifically, the workers become slaves to the objects they produce in that only as a worker can they maintain themselves as a physical subject, and it is only as a physical subject that they are a worker.19 The worker puts their life into the object, and their life belongs to the object.
Lukacs, delving into this concept, held that each form of objectivity presents itself immediately to consciousness as a non-earthly system without roots or history, and their effectiveness is determined by their degree of misperception as a-temporal structures.20 But objectification and reification are fundamentally different in that the former is the way people objectify themselves materially, and the latter a specific condition of the proletariat, as we will see next. And although Lukacs came to believe that objectification could not be overcome, and that it was a universal and inevitable way in which people came to understand their world, this concept was still significant in building the theory of reification. In this way, Lukacs’ urged that overcoming the problems of capitalism, and specifically capitalist reification, required an emphasis on reviving Marx’s philosophy.
Lastly, to explore how Lukacs strove to solve the practical problems of the revolution by concentrating on Marx’s early work and philosophical concerns we will investigate the concept of reification inherent in Marx’s work and concentrate on Lukac’s own theory of reification, “put together”, or fused in a sense from the concepts explored above.
First we should examine what reification means in general, and then observe how reification was inherent in Marx, and in a way, simply picked up by Lukacs. Following this we can explore what reification is for both the bourgeoisie and proletariat. Finally, we can examine how the proletariat is intended to redeem human kind from capitalism. All the while, what is most important here is to see how Lukacs has taken Marx’s philosophy and turned it to practical use in conceiving of the concept of reification.
What we mean by reification when we discuss Lukacs is the dialectical correlate of totality. The commodity structure is the embodiment of the reifying character of capitalism, because human beings are made into mere objects and subjected to a system of a-human commodity exchange. For example, the insurance salesmen see their interpersonal relationships as relations between objects, between prospective clients for their products; they seek people not as people but as victims of a transaction.21 It is a process where relationships between people become “things” and obtain a “ghostly objectness” which eliminates all traces of human interrelationships.22 Simply put, human beings become part of an impersonal process, and they are prevented from seeing that the essence of the entire process rests in human interrelationships. Human relations take the form of laws of nature and objective reality, independent of the human will.
Marx often noted that the ideas of bourgeois economists represent a failure to see beyond immediate cognition. When they wish to explain something they put themselves “in an imaginary state of affairs”, and ultimately explain nothing.23 This is because, as we have said, they are fooled into believing that structures created by human relations are “natural” or “eternal”. Lukacs too points to effects reification has upon the legal profession, where distortions come about in consciousness because human views are transformed into commodities. As for academics and intellectuals, they become sellers of their own reified spiritual gifts. Subjectivity itself, knowledge, physical constitution, powers of expression, all become commodities set in motion according to laws independent of their bearer’s personality.24 This type of reification appears most prominently in journalism, where Lukacs sees a lack of conviction, and the prostituting of experiences and beliefs. It is the problem, for both Marx and Lukacs, of dealing with a system that creates the image of a reality frozen in time.
Reification in Marx specifically, though not mentioned by its name, is “the necessary, immediate reality of every person living in capitalist society”25 People are simply incapable of penetrating man-created objects and the relations formed from their exchange, because these relations are idolized as fundamental natural laws. This, of course, harkens back to the concept of commodity fetishism, which clearly has a deeper philosophical importance than was supposed by Marxist orthodoxy. As Lukacs elucidated, Marx always examined people historically and dialectically, never generally.26
In History and Class Consciousness, Lukacs goes on to quote Marx quite often in his chapter, The Phenomenon of Reification. However, he remained above all concerned with lifting Marx’s idea that “man as an objective, sentient being is therefore a suffering being, and, since he is a being who feels his sufferings, a passionate being” which strives after their object.27 Instead of a world that is shaped by people, people are shaped by their world, and what is worse, reification penetrates the consciousness of people more deeply all the time. For example, the failure to reflect on the true meaning of scientific method is a necessary consequence of capitalist relations of production. Many “sciences”, by copying a scientific model, only create the illusion of truth. Mathematics, on the other hand, is an exact science in itself. The knowledge generated is true because it is the creation of its own branch of knowledge.28
Furthermore, in Lukacs’ work reification has both a subjective and objective existence. The objective side of reification is that a world of objects and relations between objects has come into being. Subjectively, a person’s activity is estranged from them and turned into a commodity which “goes its own way independently of man just like any consumer article”.29
Here we must also address what reification means to both the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. Lukacs argues that reification is experienced differently by different classes. He goes back to Marx, who saw that while both the proletariat and bourgeoisie experience alienation, they each experience it from a different point of view. While the bourgeois “feels at home” in this self-alienation, and is even capable of using it as its own instrument, the proletariat feels destroyed by it. Simply put, the bourgeoisie live a life similar to human existence, while the proletariat live a degraded inhuman life.
In Lukacs, whereas the bourgeoisie accept reification immediately, the proletariat is capable of mediating it. The proletariat is innately aware of the contradiction between their true human form and their social form, whereas the capitalist’s immediate need is to receive the worker and exploit their labour. Bourgeois class consciousness asserts the dominance of its worldview by incorporating and propagating rationalistic philosophy and mathematical sciences. It requires that the entire universe become “rational, reified, and controllable in principle”.30 Social life under capitalism does not appear as a chaotic confluence of irrational relations and powers, but rather a world governed by “scientific” or “natural” laws. In its reified form, reason itself becomes an expression of this alienation.
Because the bourgeoisie accept reification immediately, it is not truly reification. It is felt in its full effect by the proletariat, and no other class, which gives the proletariat a unique role in Marxist eschatology.
Reification is the worst form of alienation, claimed Lukacs, and it affects the proletariat the worst of any class. It affects them both as a commodity, and as an observer of the commodity process by which they are capable of perceiving the commodity character of their own existence. It becomes thus the determinate existential form of the worker as a subject and object simultaneously.31 Seeing themselves as part human being and part commodity becomes intolerable to the worker. For example, in the intensification or lengthening of the working day the worker cannot help but become aware of the degradation of their life and health, which allows them to penetrate to reality. But the proletariat is, as we have mentioned before, the thinking commodity; their self consciousness the self consciousness of the commodity. Escape from reification through mere consciousness is necessary, because as Lukacs stated, it causes a “split in personality” where one is trapped within their duality of subject / object.32 The “split in personality” is therapeutic, however, in the sense that it makes the worker conscious they are reified in their totality as a human being. It is a cognitive break through by which the revelation of the nature of the capitalist system is allowed. Only the proletariat is capable of doing this. They become the redeemer of mankind when they become self conscious, and this, according to Lukacs, is their “world historical destiny”.33 As a collective entity they are destined to resurrect themselves from their degradation under capitalism and simultaneously transcend reification when their essence becomes their existence; when they become a total person, or species being. When this happens, as Marx affirmed, an era characterized by the degradation of human dignity through economic dependency will be abolished, the blind forces of economic power will be broken, and in its place will come “the adequate rule which accords human dignity”. 34
Furthermore, Lukacs’ view of the proletariat as redeemer, like Marx’s, is dialectical in nature in that capitalism once again digs its own grave. The proletariat is both the product of the crisis of capitalism and simultaneously its slayer. But the proletariat does not just replace one reified culture with the other, it overcomes the possibility of reification altogether. During a transition to communism, as Marx asserts, it is “above all necessary to avoid restoring society as a fixed abstraction opposed to the individual”.35
Lukacs’ emphasis on the proletariat as redeemer also corresponds with Marx’s assertion in his Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right that “philosophy cannot be made a reality without the abolition of the proletariat, and the proletariat cannot be abolished without philosophy being made a reality.”36 Knowledge hence becomes capable of changing the world, not merely understanding it.
To delve into how Lukacs strove to solve the practical problems of the revolution by concentrating on Marx’s early work and philosophical concerns, it was above all else, necessary to explore the concept of reification inherent in Marx’s work and concentrate on Lukacs’ own theory of reification, “put together”, or fused in a sense from alienation, commodity fetishism, and objectification.
This was accomplished here by observing how reification was inherent in Marx, and in a way, simply picked up by Lukacs. Following this, we examined what reification means for both the bourgeoisie and proletariat, and finally, we observed how the proletariat are intended to redeem human kind from capitalism. What is fundamental are the ways Lukacs has taken Marx’s philosophy and turned it to practical use in conceiving of the concept of reification.
In conclusion, History and Class Consciousness is often seen as a political work intended to address the practical problem of the proletarian revolution against capitalist reification, and it is often said that Lukacs approach to this problem was to simply combine a host of theories including Marx’s economic fetishism, Weber’s concept of rationalization, Hegel’s concept of appearance, Simmel’s theory of alienation, etc. This approach fundamentally ignores his Lukacs’ contribution to Marxist thought and the practical matters he was seeking to address. Lukacs saw that overcoming the concrete problem of the world of reification, paradoxically, required a reexamination, or what we may call a rediscovery of Marxist philosophy. This refocusing concentrated on Marx’s earlier work, and to a lesser extent Capital, which Lukacs perceived to be a re-working of Marx’s philosophical thought in scientific economic form. Specifically however, Lukacs’ return to philosophy and the resulting concept of reification, according to which capitalism induces abstractions to become concrete, challenged Marxist orthodoxy, and brought Marx’s concept of alienation to the forefront as central to Marxist thinking, vital to Lukacs’ critique of the bourgeoisie, and of general importance to modern thought and the socialist movement. To explore, specifically, how Lukacs strove to solve the practical problems of the revolution by concentrating on Marx’s early work and philosophical concerns we examined Marx’s and Lukac’s understanding of alienation, commodity fetishism, objectificaltion, and finally, reification.
It is clear that the concept of reification was, in many ways, inherent in the work of Marx, even before the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844. But the accuracy with which Lukacs reproduced what was to come ten years later, in the Manuscripts, is still impressive by all accounts. More importantly, his exhuming of the philosophical work of Marx has ensured that Marxism does not itself get embedded in the world of reification.
Endnotes
1 Michael Lowry, in Georg Lukacs: From Romanticism to Bolshevism, for example, believes “it is precisely this (practical and political) aspect” that accounts for the book’s reputation.
Michael Lowry, Georg Lukacs: From Romanticism to Bolshevism (trans: Patrick Camiller), Paris: Press Universitaires de France, 1976, p. 171.
2 Stephen Perkins, in Marxism and the Proletariat, cites the theories of Marx, Simmel, and Weber.
Stephen Perkins, Marxism and the Proletariat London; Boulder: Pluto Press, 1993, p. 123
Andrew Feenberg, in Lukacs, Marx and the Sources of Critical Theory, cites Marx, Weber, and Hegel. Andrew Feenberg, Lukacs, Marx and the Sources of Critical Theory, New Jersey: Roman & Littlefield, 1981, p. 61.
3 David McLellan (ed.), Karl Marx: Selected Writings, Karl Marx, “Economic and Philosophical Manuscrpits”, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002, p. 86.
4 Agnes Heller, Lukacs Revalued, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983, p. 150.
5 Marx, Selected Writings, “Economic and Philosophical Manuscrpits”, p. 87.
6 Victor Zitta, Georg Lukacs’ Marxism / Alienation, Dialectics, Revolution: A Study in Utopia and Ideology, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1964, p. 150.
7 Marx, Selected Writings, p. 90.
8 Feenberg, p. 62.
9 Lowy, p. 182.
10 Marx, Selected Writing, “Capital”, p. 473.
11 Karl Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, vol. 1, (trans: Ben Fowkes), New York: Vintage Books, 1977, p. 165.
12 Ibid.
13 Feenberg, p. 62.
14 Georg Lukacs, History and Class Consciousness: Studies in Marxist Dialectics, (trans: Rodney Livingstone), London: Merlin Press, 1968, p. 84.
15 Perkins, p. 135.
16 Lukacs, p. 84.
17 Charles Tucker (ed.), The Marx-Engels Reader, Karl Marx, “On the Jewish Question”, New York: W.W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1972, p. 50.
18 Ibid., p. 50.
19 Karl Marx: Selected Writings, “Economic and Philosophical Manuscrpits”, p. 87.
20 Feenberg, p. 157.
21 Zitta, p. 173.
22 Ibid., p. 171.
23 Karl Marx: Selected Writings, “Economic and Philosophical Manuscrpits”, p. 86.
24 Lowy, p. 182.
25 Lukacs, p. 197.
26 Ibid., p. 189.
27 Karl Marx: Selected Writings, “Economic and Philosophical Manuscrpits”, p. 113.
28 Perkins, p. 147.
29 Lukacs, p. 87.
30 Feenberg, p. 102.
31 Zitta, p. 174.
32 Ibid.
33 Ibid., p. 174-175.
34 Ibid., p. 175.
35 Karl Marx: Selected Writings, “Economic and Philosophical Manuscrpits”, p. 99.
36 Zitta, p. 179.
Bibliography
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Heller, Agnes. Lukacs Revalued. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983.
Lowry, Michael. Georg Lukacs: From Romanticism to Bolshevism. (trans: Camiller, Patrick). Paris: Press Universitaires de France, 1976.
Lukacs, Georg, History and Class Consciousness: Studies in Marxist Dialectics. (trans: Livingstone, Rodney). London: Merlin Press, 1968.
Marx, Karl. Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, vol. 1. (trans: Fowkes, Ben). New York: Vintage Books, 1977.
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